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Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design

SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1)

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design

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SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1)

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design

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Footnotes
1INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1, IAEA, Vienna (2012).
2The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
3An ‘early radioactive release’ in this context is a radioactive release for which off-site protective actions would be necessary but would be unlikely to be fully effective in due time. A ‘large radioactive release’ is a radioactive release for which off-site protective actions that are limited in terms of lengths of time and areas of application would be insufficient for the protection of people and of the environment.
4The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
5The design organization is the organization responsible for preparation of the final detailed design of the plant to be built.
6Requirements on the management system are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 [8]. (A revision of this publication is in preparation, to be issued as GSR Part 2)
7The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
8Requirements on radiation protection and safety of radiation sources are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards [9].
9A ‘cliff edge effect’, in a nuclear power plant, is an instance of severely abnormal plant behaviour caused by an abrupt transition from one plant status to another following a small deviation in a plant parameter, and thus a sudden large variation in plant conditions in response to a small variation in an input.
10Requirements on safety assessment for facilities and activities are established in GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1) [2].
11Requirements on site evaluation for nuclear installations are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3 (Rev. 1), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations [10].
12A ‘cliff edge effect’, in a nuclear power plant, is an instance of severely abnormal plant behaviour caused by an abrupt transition from one plant status to another following a small deviation in a plant parameter, and thus a sudden large variation in plant conditions in response to a small variation in an input.
13The analysis of design extension conditions for the plant could be performed by means of a best estimate approach (more stringent approaches may be used according to States’ requirements).
14The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
15For returning the plant to a safe state or for mitigating the consequences of an accident, consideration could be given to the full design capabilities of the plant and to the temporary use of additional systems.
16The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
17A single failure is a failure that results in the loss of capability of a system or component to perform its intended safety function(s) and any consequential failure(s) that result from it. The single failure criterion is a criterion (or requirement) applied to a system such that it must be capable of performing its task in the presence of any single failure.
18Requirements on safety assessment for facilities and activities are established in GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1) [2].
19A ‘cliff edge effect’, in a nuclear power plant, is an instance of severely abnormal plant behaviour caused by an abrupt transition from one plant status to another following a small deviation in a plant parameter, and thus a sudden large variation in plant conditions in response to a small variation in an input.
20A ‘cliff edge effect’, in a nuclear power plant, is an instance of severely abnormal plant behaviour caused by an abrupt transition from one plant status to another following a small deviation in a plant parameter, and thus a sudden large variation in plant conditions in response to a small variation in an input.
21In most cases, one containment isolation valve or check valve is outside the containment and the other is inside the containment. Other arrangements might be acceptable, however, depending on the design.
22Non-permanent equipment need not necessarily be stored on the site.
23Emergency response facilities are addressed in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency [11]. For nuclear power plants, emergency response facilities (which are separate from the control room and the supplementary control room) include the technical support centre, the operational support centre and the emergency centre.
24A prime mover is a component (such as a motor, solenoid operator or pneumatic operator) that converts energy into action when commanded by an actuation device.
25Non-permanent equipment need not necessarily be stored on the site.
26The possibility of certain conditions arising may be considered to have been ‘practically eliminated’ if it would be physically impossible for the conditions to arise or if these conditions could be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.
27Non-permanent equipment need not necessarily be stored on the site.
28Requirements on radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources for facilities and activities are established in GSR Part 3 [9].
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Tags applicable to this publication

  • Publication type:Specific Safety Requirements
  • Publication number: SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1)
  • Publication year: 2015
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