1INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Systems for Reporting Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Series No. 93, IAEA, Vienna (1989).

2INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, A System for the Feedback of Experience from Events in Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.11, IAEA, Vienna (2006).

3In this Safety Guide, an ‘event’ is as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary [9]: “any occurrence unintended by the operator, including operating error, equipment failure or other mishap, and deliberate action on the part of others, the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of protection and safety.” This definition includes initiating events, accident precursors, near misses, accidents (all as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary [9]), as well as unauthorized acts. Operating experience includes, but is not limited to, experience from such events.

4In the context of this Safety Guide, ‘external operating experience’ is experience from outside the installation, whether from within the same State or from another State, from installations that use similar technologies or from those that use different technologies.

5Such centralized functions typically include:

Coordination of and support for the handling of internal operating experience to ensure compliance with the organization’s processes;

Screening and analysis of external operating experience and dissemination among the relevant installations;

Training of personnel on the operating experience programme;

Independent investigation of significant events, as necessary

6A ‘just culture’ is an organizational culture in which front line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.

7‘Major corrective actions’ include those actions taken to prevent the recurrence of internal events with significant implications for safety or the occurrence of major external events. Such actions are therefore distinct from other corrective actions taken in response to less significant events, although the latter are still necessary for safety.

8The IAEA provides support for the application of this Safety Guide through its PROSPER service (peer review of the effectiveness of the operational safety performance experience review process), available upon request by a Member State. PROSPER missions involve a combination of two types of peer review: (a) a programmatic review of the overall effectiveness of the operating experience feedback process for an installation or utility and (b) a review focused on unresolved significant safety issues or specific events. PROSPER is available to all IAEA Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation.